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1Attribution Mechanisms for Ancillary Service Costs
Induced by Variability in Power Delivery
Francesca Bona, Nicolas Gast, Jean-Yves Le Boudec, Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE, Dan-Cristian Tomozei
Abstract—The increased penetration of renewable energy
sources in existing power systems has led to necessary devel-
opments in electricity market mechanisms. Most importantly,
renewable energy generation is increasingly made accountable
for deviations between scheduled and actual energy generation.
However, there is no mechanism to enforce accountability for the
additional costs induced by power fluctuations. These costs are
socialized and eventually supported by electricity customers. We
propose some metrics for assessing the contribution of all market
participants to power regulation needs, as well as an attribution
mechanism for fairly redistributing related power regulation
costs. We discuss the effect of various metrics used by the
attribution mechanisms, and we illustrate, in a game-theoretical
framework, their consequences on the strategic behavior of
market participants. We also illustrate, by using the case of
Western Denmark, how these mechanisms may affect revenues
and the various market participants.
Index Terms—Electricity markets, ancillary services, power
fluctuations, attribution mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE necessary constant balance between the generationand consumption of electricity is challenged by recent
developments in power systems. Mainly, we think of the rapid
increase in the penetration of renewable energy sources, mostly
wind and solar power, with their inherent fluctuations in power
generation over a broad range of temporal and spatial scales
[1]. Also, requiring electric loads to become more active could
actually induce new types of fluctuations in their consumption
patterns [2]. Accommodating the resulting net load fluctuations
in a liberalized electricity market environment is one of the
current challenges to be faced by system operators. Consid-
ering operational time-scales, ancillary service procurement
is the key mechanism for ensuring access to the resources
necessary to guarantee a reliable and economic operation
of power systems. Such services can be split into power
and energy related categories: primary reserves act instantly
and focus on power only; tertiary reserves focus on energy
only; and secondary reserves comprise a mix of both, by
relieving primary reserves while acting as a transition before
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full activation of tertiary reserves. A recent overview of various
reserves and their purposes in power system operations can be
found in [3]. The need to redesign ancillary service markets
in a new context of high renewable energy penetration is
receiving renewed attention, see e.g. [4], [5], while optimal
market design with increased renewable energy generation is
an open question [6], [7].
Wholesale electricity markets were proposed to make the
operation of power systems more economic and efficient. A
key concept is balance responsibility: both power suppliers
and consumers are deemed accountable for deviations between
their scheduled and actual production (resp., consumption).
Renewable energy generation, with its limited predictability,
is increasingly required to take part in such mechanisms to
be financially responsible for the energy regulation needs
it induces. However, balance responsibility is enforced for
energy only (through the balancing market), with energy
imbalances calculated periodically at a time-unit granularity
that depends on the market/power-system (e.g., hourly in
the Scandinavian Nord Pool and every 15 minutes in the
Dutch APX). In contrast, the costs of power-related regulation
services are socialized and nearly always supported by the
demand side (see for instance the ENTSO-E overview in [8]).
This can be seen as fair if such costs originate from demand-
side fluctuations only, or if such costs are low and it is not
possible to attribute them to the various market actors. We
argue here that these costs are non-negligible, while it may
be possible to assess the contribution of the various actors of
the system to these overall regulation costs. Somehow, current
market structures implicitly assume that all participants on the
supply side deliver energy at a constant power level during
each time-unit. In future power-systems where the need for
increased power-related services might substantially originate
from the production side, power suppliers should be made
accountable as in the case of energy-related regulation.
We propose and analyze some attribution mechanisms for
the costs induced by power-related regulation needs. These
readily complement existing mechanisms for energy-related
regulation. The concept of energy-neutral power profiles en-
ables us to separate the needs of energy- and power-related
regulation. Next, the contribution of every actor to the overall
power regulation cost is determined based on individual versus
overall fluctuations over a market time interval. We investigate,
in a game-theoretical framework, the theoretical properties of
these mechanisms and we use simulation to illustrate these
concepts based on a theoretical model and the realistic test
case of Western Denmark, already largely penetrated by wind
power generation. We employ German data to assess the costs
of power-related regulation and to build representative supply
2curves for power-related system services. Although socializing
these costs might have been a natural option so far, we believe
it is important to see whether better mechanisms could reveal
and share these costs among the various actors of the power
system. These new mechanisms could also better support new
business cases, e.g., storage and demand response, to support
renewable energy integration [9].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we assess
today’s costs of power-related regulation services, based on
the test cases of Germany and Western Denmark. We describe
our market framework in Section III, complementing market-
participants’ revenues with a component reflecting the power-
regulation costs they induce. In Section IV we provide insights
into the properties of our attribution mechanisms. We illustrate
the concept and analyze the resulting revenues for market
participants, using a toy model example in Section V and
the more realistic test-case of Western Denmark in Section
VI. We present our concluding remarks and perspectives in
Section VII.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT BETTER
ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF POWER VARIABILITY
In order to estimate the costs induced by power-related
regulation and to quantify their importance in current power-
systems, we carried out a country-wide comparison between
regulation costs linked to power fluctuations and those related
to energy imbalances. The comparison is based on the ratio be-
tween costs associated with power-related and energy-related
regulation services. The former costs stem from the reservation
of primary reserves whereas the latter cover energy-balancing
costs through the activation of secondary and tertiary reserves.
Note that secondary reserves can also contribute to some form
of power-related regulation, by relieving primary reserves after
a certain period. The related costs, however, are not made
public (and are perhaps not even calculated). Hence, they
are disregarded here. A direct consequence is that the ratio
values calculated here are a lower-bound estimate on the true
ratio between power and energy-related regulation costs. The
analysis covers an entire year of operation (2014) and two
different European control areas, Western Denmark and Ger-
many. In the former case, data with an hourly resolution can
be readily downloaded from the website of the Transmission
System Operator (Energinet.dk) of Denmark. The distribution
of the ratio between power- and energy-related regulation costs
is depicted in Figure 1, based on the 8760 values for 2014. This
distribution has a long tail but also a high concentration close
to zero, which indicates that, in most cases, power-related
regulation is substantially less expensive than energy-related
regulation; though in few case the opposite is true, with much
higher power-related regulation costs. The central 50% range
of ratio values, given by 1st and 3rd quartiles in Figure 1, is
between 6% and 29%. For 2014 in Western Denmark, the
overall cost induced by power-related services was 9.9% of
that for energy-related regulation services.
Similarly for the case of Germany, data for the procure-
ment and usage of ancillary services over the same year
was retrieved from the internet platform for control reserve
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Fig. 1. Histogram of the ratio between costs induced by power-related and
energy-related regulation services in Western Denmark in 2014.
tendering (www.regelleistung.net) of the four German TSOs.
The overall cost induced by power-related services was 18.1%
of that for energy-related regulation services. For these two
power-systems with significant renewable energy generation,
it appears that the costs induced by power fluctuations (which
could come from both supply and demand sides) are not neg-
ligible. Also, the ratio of these costs highly varies throughout
the year, depending on weather conditions, operating points of
the power systems, etc.
III. MARKET FRAMEWORK
A. Power Profiles and Energy-Neutral Power Profiles
Let us consider a given market participant i, who does not
participate in the regulation services; this participant can be on
the side of supply, demand, or both. It is intuitively expected
that the market participants of interest here are those that
induce power-regulation needs owing to fluctuations in their
power delivery or consumption profiles. Regulation resources
are not concerned by the attribution mechanisms described
in the following, as they are those who originally provide
regulation services.
The power production of participant i is denoted by qi(t),
where t denotes time. In the case of a renewable energy
generator, this power profile would be a direct function of
the weather. Different forms of control (e.g., direct control of
generators) allow altering qi(t) and obtain the power profile
pi(t) eventually delivered to the market and power system.
The absence of control translates to pi(t) = qi(t). We follow
the convention that positive power means production whereas
negative power means consumption.
We can think of a power profile as a continuous function
over a market time unit T , the duration of which is denoted
by T . In practice, power profiles would be obtained based on
a (most likely uniform) sampling of p. This would yield the
sample power profile pi = [pi,t1 pi,t2 . . . pi,tn ]
> of actor i,
as a discretized version of pi for a number n of measurement
times tj , j = 1, . . . , n. To simplify notations in the following,
3we ignore the distinction between continuous and sampled
versions of power profiles.
The energy generated by participant i over T is
Ei =
∫
T
pi(t) dt. (1)
Energy imbalances are already settled through existing market
mechanisms, thus separating energy and power related aspects.
This naturally leads to the definition of the energy-neutral
power profile p˜i of market participant i, which we define as
its power profile minus its mean over that time-unit, i.e.,
p˜i(t) = pi(t)− Ei
T
. (2)
Consequently, power delivery can be split into an energy
part Ei/T and an energy-neutral power profile p˜i. In practice,
when sampling power production, an energy-neutral power
profile can be obtained a posteriori at the end of T .
B. Extending Current Market Settlement to Account for Power
Profiles
Consider a market time-unit T , over which market partici-
pants have received their energy production and consumption
schedules after day-ahead market clearing. Typically in Eu-
rope, T corresponds to T = 1 hour, though this is expected
to shorten in future market designs to better accommodate
renewables and pro-active demand. As of now, a market
participant i on the supply side has a revenue related to energy
only, more precisely its scheduled energy generation Efi is
to be remunerated at the spot price pis, whereas imbalances
(Ei −Efi) will be be eventually settled through the balancing
market at price pib. This yields the overall revenue Ri as
Ri = pi
sEfi + pi
b(Ei − Efi) . (3)
In the above, pis is the result of the day-ahead market clearing
and pib is the result of the balancing-market clearing, under
one-price or two-price settlement approaches. For an extensive
discussion on these aspects, the reader is referred to [10]. The
market functioning on the demand side is similar, except that
revenues become payments.
In this current setup, the market does not give consideration
to the power profile that allows for such energy delivery Ei
over T . Our proposal is to add a new component of the market-
related revenue that reflects the variability in power-delivery
and the consequent need for ancillary services. The revenue
of a supplier in the market is hence generalized to
Ri = pi
sEfi + pi
b(Ei − Efi) +Rpi (4)
where Rpi is the part of the revenue linked to the energy
neutral power-delivery profile p˜i. It is intuitively expected to be
negative for renewable energy generators, as it penalizes them
for fluctuations in their power delivery. Asking a renewable
power producer to be accountable for their power-delivery
profiles does not go against an overall goal of integrating
renewable energies in current power-systems, similarly to the
case of energy balancing costs (pib(Ei − Efi) in (4)). We will
show and discuss in the following that similar approaches of
one-price and two-price settlements can be applied, depending
on the mechanisms used to obtain Rpi . Note that applying
controls on original power generation qi(t) to improve the
power delivery pi(t) does not affect the day-ahead revenue
pisEfi, whereas it potentially affects the revenue from both the
balancing market pib(Ei − Efi) and power delivery Rpi .
For justification, let us discuss here a natural decomposition
of regulation costs in terms of power and energy. First, we
define the cost of regulation over a market time-unit T as the
integral of a function f of the total power of non-regulating
participants’ mismatch at time t,
total regulation cost =
∫
T
f
(∑
i
pi(t)
)
dt . (5)
This regulation cost includes all costs necessary to ensure safe
operation, including power balance and loss compensation.
The cost function f is most often considered as quadratic or
close to that (see, e.g., [11]). After expanding the expression
of f around the total mean power
∑
i
Ei
T , the right-hand side
in (5) becomes∫
T
[
f
(
Etot
T
)
+ f ′
(
Etot
T
)
p˜tot(t) + a (p˜tot(t))
2
]
dt (6)
where p˜tot(t) =
∑
i p˜i(t), Etot =
∑
iEi and a =
1
2f
′′(EtotT ).
Following the definition of the energy-neutral power profile in
(2),
∫
T ptot(t) = 0. This gives the decomposition
total regulation cost ≈ Re +Rp (7)
with Re = Tf
(
Etot
T
)
, Rp = a
∫
T
(p˜tot(t))
2
dt. (8)
Hence the total regulation-cost decomposes into a sum of two
terms: one that depends on only the total energy produced
by all players and one that integrates the square of the
instantaneous power mismatch. The first term is compensated
by the balancing market and the ancillary services based only
on energy, the second term should be compensated by a
mechanism inline with our proposal, focused on variability in
power delivery (or consumption). Note that in our proposal,
loads and as distributed generation should be accountable for
the costs induced by power variability.
There is an interaction between a mechanism that attributes
the costs of power profiles, as discussed here, and penalties
for energy imbalances. Indeed, in energy markets, a participant
that deviates from her dispatch plan has to pay for the deviation
and incurs a penalty. Such deviations are measured at the
energy timescale, say every 15 minutes. It follows that a
participant might have an incentive to mitigate a deviation at
the expense of increased variability. To illustrate, consider a
market participant that sold 100 units of energy at a price
pi, and is able to deliver only 80 units during a time-slot
of 15 minutes. Assume the up-regulation price is of 1.5pi.
This participant received 100pi from the day-ahead market and
has to buy back (100 − 80) units when settlement occurs,
at a price of 1.5pi, for a total revenue of 70pi. Instead of
paying the up-regulation price, this participant might find it
more advantageous to produce the missing energy on local
additional generators, as long at the generation cost is less than
the up-regulation price. For example, after observing during
410 minutes that her plant is delivering much less power than
planned, she could decide to generate additional energy for
a duration of 5 minutes, so that the total delivered energy
matches the dispatch plan. If she manages to do so, she
will deliver the contracted energy, but with large variability.
This variability induces costs that will be divided amongst
consumers. With our proposal, the cost of variability is made
explicit; every participant will have to account for it when
preparing dispatch plans and deciding about real-time power
controls.
IV. ATTRIBUTION MECHANISMS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
We propose and analyze here a number of mechanisms for
attributing the costs induced by power fluctuations.
A. Metrics for Attribution of Power-regulation Costs
After regulation costs Rp are known, i.e., after operating
over the market time unit T , our proposal is to distribute them
among the various actors of the power system (on both supply
and demand side), proportionally to a given metric di, defined
hereafter, and that depends on the energy-neutral profile p˜i of
actor i. The fraction of the power-regulation costs attributed
to actor i is then given by
Rpi =
di∑
j dj
Rp . (9)
Various forms of metrics can be defined depending upon the
objective of interest. In the following, we focus on metrics
that relate to power capacity, integrated mismatch, mileage,
and contribution to the total power profile. This last metric
should be viewed as different from the others, as it requires
comparing individual and total power profiles, whereas the
first three are defined based on only individual profiles. In
general such metrics are in line with recent developments in
regulation markets, where consideration is given to the form
of power profiles that will be used for providing regulation,
see [12] and references therein.
a) Power Capacity Metric: Our first metric focuses on
the capacity required to compensate fluctuations and therefore
relates to the L∞ norm of the energy-neutral power profile.
Such a metric equally considers positive and negative fluc-
tuations by only focusing on a maximum deviation from the
constant power profile. Formally, for an energy-neutral power
profile p˜i, related to market participant i, the power capacity
metric dpci is defined as
dpci = ‖p˜i‖∞ = maxt∈T |p˜i(t)| . (10)
For a robust estimate dc,i, instead of looking at the max-
imum in (10), we would prefer to estimate a quantile with
nominal level close to 1 from the distribution of the sampled
version of |p˜i|.
b) Integrated Mismatch Metric: Contrary to capacity,
which relates to some extreme characteristics of p˜i, with
this metric we consider that the integrated mismatch is the
quantity of interest, thus relating to a Lk norm (k = 1, 2) of
these profiles. Formally, for an energy-neutral power profile p˜i,
related to market participant i, the integrated mismatch metric
of order k, dimki , is defined as
dimki = ‖p˜i‖k =
(∫
T
|p˜i(t)|kdt
) 1
k
. (11)
c) Mileage Metric: If, in addition to capacity and inte-
grated mismatch, some of the dynamic properties of energy-
neutral profiles are of importance, mileage-type metrics can
be introduced, related to the Lk (k = 1, 2) norm of the h-
order derivative of p˜i. In practice, it might be most relevant
to stick to the case for which k = 1 and h = 1. Hence, for an
energy-neutral power profile p˜i, related to market participant
i, the mileage metric dmi is defined as
dmi = ‖p˜′i‖1 =
∫
T
∣∣∣∣dp˜idt (t)
∣∣∣∣ dt . (12)
d) Contribution Metric: In contrast to the previous three
metrics, emphasis can be placed on the respective contribution
of each market participant to the total power profile. For a
given market time-unit, the total energy-neutral profile was
introduced in (6). The contribution metric of market participant
i depends on both the energy-neutral profile of this participant
and total energy-neutral profile. More precisely, for an energy-
neutral power profile p˜i, related to market participant i, its
contribution metric dci to the total power profile p˜tot is defined
as
dci =
∫
T
p˜i(t)p˜tot(t)dt . (13)
i.e. dci is the inner product of p˜i and p˜tot. It follows that
dci/
∑
j d
c
j represents the component of p˜i in the direction of
p˜tot.
B. Properties of the Various Metrics
Note that the first three metrics are non-negative and have
a minimum equal to 0 when power delivery is constant.
Therefore, a market participant with a very large variability
is always penalized with a high power-regulation cost.
In contrast, the contribution metric can be either negative
or positive, indicating whether individual market participants
compensate or add to fluctuations in the total power profile.
It might not penalize a participant, depending on whether the
fluctuations of its power profile increase the total regulation
cost or reduce it. In the latter case, this participant’s power-
regulation cost is negative, i.e., it is a revenue. Consequently,
for the contribution metric, we can use one-price or two-price
settlement schemes, like in the case of energy imbalances (in
the latter case, any positive revenue would be made null).
In the case-studies below, only one-price settlement will be
considered. Overall, one can conclude that the first three
metrics do not reflect the market participants’ contribution
to the overall imbalance, whereas the contribution metric (as
suggested by its name) does so.
Let us examine the resilience of the four proposed metrics
to collusion. Consider that a set M of market participants
colludes and appears as a single aggregated market participant.
5Call dcM the contribution metric that is attributed to this
aggregated participant in the new resulting market. Then
dcM =
∑
i∈M
dci . (14)
This follows immediately from (13) and from the fact that
p˜tot(t) is not modified by the aggregation. In other words,
the contribution metric is additive. It follows that the power-
regulation costs are also additive, in particular
RpM =
∑
i∈M
Rpi (15)
whenever the metric d used in (9) is the contribution metric
(here RpM is the power-regulation cost attributed to M). It
follows that the power-regulation costs attributed by using this
metric are also additive.
In contrast, the additivity property does not hold for the first
three metrics. We have, for the power capacity metric,
dpcM ≤
∑
i∈M
dpci (16)
and the same holds for the integrated mismatch and the
mileage metrics. This follows from the triangular inequality
for Lp norms. In most case, we expect the inequality in (16)
to be strict for each of the first three metrics.
Consider now the case where the metric used for the
computation of power-regulation costs is one of the first three
metrics. Then we have
RpM =
dM
dM +
∑
j 6∈M dj
ctot (17)
where the notation dM, di stands for d
pc
M, d
pc
i [resp. d
imk
M ,
dimki or d
m
M, d
m
i ]. Note that for a > 0 the function x 7→ xx+a
is increasing.
Apply this to x = dM, x′ =
∑
i∈M di and a =
∑
j 6∈M dj ,
it follows that
RpM ≤
∑
i∈M
Rpi (18)
whenever the metric is one of the first three metrics, and in
general the inequality in (18) is strict.
We conclude that the first three metrics are sub-additive,
as are the power-regulation costs. It follows that there is an
incentive for market participants to appear as an aggregate
rather than as individuals. In contrast, with the contribution
metric, the power-regulation cost attributed to any aggregate
of participants is the sum of the individual power-regulation
costs, and there is no such incentive.
In order to distribute the regulation cost (9) at the end of
each market time-unit T , each of the four metrics needs to
be computed based on actual measurements. In practice, this
can be done as follows. Each market participant samples her
own power profile during a market time-unit T at n time
instants t1, . . . , tn. At the end of the market time-unit, each
market participant can compute her sampled energy-neutral
power profile. Even if the sampling times {tk}nk=1 do not
perfectly coincide across market participants, the first three
metrics can be well estimated locally based on this vector of
measurements. The fourth metric however requires knowledge
of the total sampled energy-neutral power profile. This “total
profile” makes sense only if the market participants are syn-
chronized and sample their profiles at the same time instants
{tk}nk=1. Subsequently all measurement vectors need to be
communicated to a central collection point where their sum
is computed and with it the contribution metric. Alternatively,
the total energy-neutral profile can be itself measured at the
same time instants and the resulting regulation cost distributed
only among instrumented market participants.
In summary, among the four metrics, the contribution metric
has highly desirable properties: it reflects market participants’
contributions to the total imbalance and is resilient to col-
lusion. In practice, however, its estimation is more complex
than the first three metrics, as it requires synchronized mea-
surements and induces higher communication costs. In the
following we compare numerically the attribution of regulation
costs according to the four metrics.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED METRICS
A. System Model and Parameters
We consider a simple market composed of strategic players
i = 1, . . . , n who are all wind producers, plus one non-
strategic player who represents the aggregate load. Our goal
is to study the decisions of the strategic players for the next
time-slot. After day-ahead market clearing, it is expected that
player i will deliver constant power qfi for the entire duration
of the time-slot. In real-time, at a given time t, producer
i can produce up to qi(t) units of power at time t and
his only strategic decision can be to curtail its production
and produce pi(t) ≤ qi(t). We also assume that the value
qi(t) is known to producer i, this corresponds to an ideal
case of having access to perfect information. This value is
equal to qi(t) = q
f
i + Wi(t) where Wi(t) is the deviation
from the forecast. In the numerical evaluation, the values
Wi(t) are generated by using a temporal covariance model
inspired by the model in [13], where marginal predictive
densities for every lead time have a beta distributions with
mean qfi . To keep things simple, we consider that the load
is not strategic (there is no player associated to the loads),
is perfectly forecast, and is constant over the next time-slot.
These are simplifying assumptions that can be readily relaxed.
After market clearing, we expect perfect balance between
generators’ power production and load forecasts, thus the load
power profile in the next time-slot is constant and equal to
−∑i qfi .
1) Regulation Costs: The fraction of the power-regulation
costs attributed to player i is given by (8) and (9), with
p˜tot(t) =
∑n
i=1 pi(t) −
∑
i q
f
i and di is the value for player
i of the chosen metric (one of the four metrics defined in
Section IV). As the load is assumed to be constant over the
time scale of interest, its metric is 0 and therefore does not
bear any regulation costs in this simple example.
In order to complete the analysis, we need to also account
for the energy-regulation costs; we take
pib(Ei − Efi) =
Ei − Efi∑n
i=1(Ei − Efi )
Re, i = 1, . . . , n (19)
6where Re is given by (8) with Etot =
∑n
i=1(Ei − Efi ). For
the load the energy-regulation cost is 0. The total regulation
cost for player i = 1, . . . , n is equal to the sum of (9) and
(19).
For the numerical evaluation, we choose an instantaneous
cost function f equal to:
f(x) = αx+ βx2 . (20)
We set β = 5 and compare the results for α = −1 and
α = 0. The case α = −1 represents the current frequent
practice where production is encouraged (despite the penalty
for deviating from the bid, each supplementary unit produced
is still rewarded at a unit price of 1 – thus, a small over-
production is rewarded). The case α = 0 discourages both
over-production and under-production.
2) Nash Equilibrium: When a strategic player i decides
to produce a profile pi, it influences both its energy and
power-regulation costs. Her actions also influence the cost
that others have to pay, as the profile pi modifies Re and
Rp. In the following, we will explore numerically a possible
equilibrium situation in which no actor has an incentive to
deviate unilaterally from her power profile.
For this, we consider the classic notion of Nash equilibrium
[14] that, in our case, is defined as follows. Let p−i denote
the power profiles of all players except i, for i = 1, . . . , n.
A tuple of profiles p1 . . . pn is a Nash equilibrium if for all
player i,
• For all t: 0 ≤ pi(t) ≤ qi(t);
• The profile pi minimizes the cost of player i, given by
(9) and (19), given that the power profiles of the others,
p−i, are fixed.
In our case, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed
by the continuity of the cost function.
B. Numerical Evaluation of the Nash Equilibria
1) Numerical Method: We implemented a numerical algo-
rithm that computes a Nash equilibrium for the four metrics.
For each metric, we run our algorithm on the same forty
scenarios for qf and pf . Our numerical algorithm uses an
iterative procedure that converges to a Nash equilibrium. For
a player i, denote by p∗i (p−i) the power profile that minimizes
the cost of player i given that the profiles of the other players
p−i remain constant. Initially, we set the power profile of
every player equal to pi(t) = qi(t) (the amount of energy that
would be produced without control, which is the maximum
production for the wind producer). Then we repeatedly update
the power profiles (pi) in a round-robin fashion, by setting
pi = 0.5pi + 0.5p
∗
i (p−i) until |pi − p∗i (p−i)| ≤ 10−7.
Convergence is reached after a maximum of a few hundreds
of iterations in all tested cases.
2) Average Performance of Nash Equilibria: In Table I,
we report the total regulation cost, averaged over the forty
scenarios. We compare seven values:
• the total regulation costs given by the Nash equilibria
(one for each metric),
TABLE I
AVERAGE COST OVER ALL SCENARIOS.
Average cost when α = −1 and β = 5
dpc dim1 dim2 dm dc no control optimal
Total cost 5.75 5.64 5.54 6.16 5.47 6.83 5.33
Energy cost 3.39 3.35 3.55 3.54 3.47 3.62 3.68
Power cost 2.37 2.29 2.00 2.62 2.00 3.21 1.65
Average cost when α = 0 and β = 5
dpc dim1 dim2 dm dc no control optimal
Total cost 3.08 3.09 3.17 3.52 3.07 7.33 2.99
Energy cost 2.14 2.16 2.34 2.30 2.37 4.12 2.15
Power cost 0.95 0.93 0.83 1.22 0.70 3.21 0.83
• the total regulation costs when there is no control, i.e.
each producer maximizes her production (she sets pi(t) =
qi(t)),
• the optimal, obtained from a hypothetical centrally com-
puted allocation that minimizes Re(p¯) + Rp(p˜) while
respecting the constraints pi(t) ≤ qi(t) for every player i
and every time t. The optimal is not feasible in practice
but serves as a benchmark.
We make two key observations. First, all metrics lead
the producers to adopt power profiles that reduce the total
regulation costs compared to producing the maximal power.
These regulation costs are all strictly greater than the optimal
allocation, meaning that no metric encourages players to
adopt a globally optimal allocation. Second, the average total
regulation cost of the Nash equilibrium with the contribution
metric is lower than with all other metrics and is only a few
percent off the optimal. Also, the average power-regulation
costs with the contribution metric is always smaller than with
the others. This can be explained by the fact that for the
contribution metric, di can be negative when a player helps the
system, meaning that a player can be paid to help the system.
For the other metrics, the quantity di is always positive, hence
even if a player can help the system, he always has an incentive
to have a flat profile, if possible.
3) Qualitative Difference between the Different Metrics:
We now focus on one of the forty scenarios for which we
plot the production as a function of time in Fig. 2 (for
α = −1) and Fig. 3 (for α = 0). These show the production
of two players with different characteristics: Player 1 has a
maximal production that varies over time whereas Player 2 has
a constant maximal production (this occurs when the generator
saturates at its maximum capacity). We compare the Nash
equilibria when using the contribution metric with using the
integrated mismatch metric with k = 2. For the other metrics,
the results are qualitatively similar to the integrated mismatch
metric with k = 2 and are not shown for lack of space.
We observe first that when α = −1 (Fig. 2), i.e., when extra
energy is bought back despite producers deviating from their
bids, all players produce close to their maximal capacity. As a
result, the total production fluctuates (Fig. 2(c)). When α = 0
(Fig. 3), i.e., when the regulation cost penalizes overproduction
as well as underproduction, players are more flexible and
produce profiles that are flatter. The total production is then
almost constant (Fig. 3(c)). Second, with all metrics other than
the contribution metric, the players are encouraged to have an
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Fig. 2. Production as a function of time in the Nash equilibrium when the
instantaneous regulation cost is given by Equation (20) with α = −1 and β =
5. For this scenario, the cost without control is −1.0, the cost of the optimal
allocation is 0.10, of the equilibrium of the integrated mismatch metric −2.0,
and of the equilibrium of the contribution metric −2.5.
almost constant profile (if possible). The situation is different
with the contribution metric, because players are remunerated
when they help the system. This is particularly visible in
Fig. 3(a,b). This again explains why in Table I, the power
costs, with the capacity and integrated mismatch metrics, are
larger than with the contribution metric.
In summary, the evaluation in this section highlights the
differences between the first three metrics and the contribution
metric: This fourth metric encourages players to globally help
the system, whereas the first three metrics encourage constant
profiles. It also illustrates that there is little difference between
the first three metrics.
VI. APPLICATION RESULTS ON A COUNTRY-WIDE SCALE
Owing to its current and projected penetration of renewable
energy generation, Denmark is seen as an ideal test case
area for analyzing how regulation costs that are induced by
variability in power delivery would be redistributed to the
actors of the system. We assume here that both wind power
generation and demand may contribute to power fluctuations.
As a basis for simulations, power delivery profiles of wind
power producers are generated using the CorWind simulation
tool of the Technical University of Denmark, Department
of Wind Energy, based on the spectral methods originally
described in [15], [16]. This tool can generate realistic wind-
speed and power time-series over the entire Western Denmark
area, accounting for the stochastic behavior of power fluc-
tuations, and mimicking space-time covariance structures for
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Fig. 3. Production as a function of time in the Nash equilibrium when the
instantaneous regulation cost is given by (20) with α = 0 and β = 5. For this
scenario, the cost without control is 6.5, the cost of the optimal allocation is
0.10, of the equilibrium of the integrated mismatch metric, 0.13 and of the
equilibrium of the contribution metric 0.14.
these fluctuations. The driving signal is given by meteorologi-
cal simulations from the Weather Research and Forecasting
(WRF) model. The conversion of wind speed to power is
performed with simple steady-state power curves.
We consider here a setup with 41 wind farms located across
Western Denmark and that respects the actual spatial density of
wind farms. 7 were located offshore and 34 onshore. The total
capacity is approximately 1.500 MW. An extensive description
of the setup for this case-study, locations and capacities of
wind farms, etc., can be found in [17]. In order to first illustrate
the outcome of employing these attribution mechanisms, a
random day of the year 2014 was chosen (March 1st), with
a sampling based on a time resolution of 30 seconds for
the power profiles from the wind farms. Based on power-
delivery profiles for the entire day, emphasis is placed on a
given hour, 1-2pm, for illustrative purposes (Fig. 4). Realistic
fluctuations for the power demand with the same resolution
were also generated, in order to put in perspective power
variability on the demand and supply sides. The stochastic-
process simulation-method employed, based on a first-order
Gaussian process, can be found in [17].
Power-regulation costs and their attribution can be analyzed
for several temporal resolutions. Currently the market time-
unit in Denmark is 1 hour. However, with increased penetration
of renewables, it is envisaged to shorten it to possibly 30
minutes, 15 minutes or even 5 minutes. These resolutions
are then considered to calculate energy-neutral power profiles
and the resulting power-regulation costs. An illustration of the
8impact of using different time-resolutions is provided in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. From total power profiles to energy-neutral power profiles for the 1st
of March, 1pm to 2pm.
The maximum asolute value of these energy-neutral power
profiles indicate how much capacity might be needed to
perform power-regulation, hence to obtain the cost from
activating reserves. Here, to determine those costs based on
supply curves, we used sample supply curves from the German
primary reserve market (Fig. 5), scaled to the size of the
Danish reserve market. This is for the sake of illustration only,
as the most important aspect of this analysis is how such costs
will be distributed, not the level of the costs.
Fig. 5. Sample supply curves from the German primary reserve market, and
scale difference with the Danish primary reserve clearing outcomes (from
2014).
The power-regulation costs induced by fluctuations in wind-
power delivery and consumption profiles were determined
for the various temporal resolutions considered. The total
costs for the procurement of primary reserves are summarized
in Table II, for the various sample supply-curves shown in
Fig. 5. A reduction in time resolution yields a decrease in
overall power-regulation costs, because fluctuations have a
lower magnitude. The order of magnitude of these costs also
seems consistent with the real primary-reserve market hourly-
costs in Western Denmark, which over the year 2014 had a
mean value of 522 e/h and a maximum value of 2.296 e/h.
These costs, however, especially those calculated with the hour
time-resolution, are likely to be overestimated because, even if
market time-units are hourly in the Danish regulation markets,
reserves are operated on finer time steps.
TABLE II
TOTAL POWER-REGULATION COSTS FOR 3 TIME RESOLUTIONS AND 7
SUPPLY CURVES.
Curve id.
Hour
resolution
[e/h]
Half hour
resolution
[e/h]
Quarter
of hour
resolution
[e/h]
1 436.64 365.78 275.28
2 515.84 416.33 313.78
3 532.52 443.46 395.18
4 598.28 492.83 373.14
5 655.12 550.95 417.84
6 691.89 574.26 436.96
7 1051.76 841.71 601.84
We computed the values of the 4 proposed metrics for all 41
wind power producers, as well as for the demand. We place
emphasis on the case of 15-minute time resolution and the
primary-reserve supply-curve no. 2. The share of the total costs
to be supported by each generator during that single hour is
illustrated in Fig. 6. These results can be readily compared
to the case where power-regulation costs would be socialized
and fully covered by the demand side. The first row gives
the respective contribution of each actor to the overall costs,
depending on the metric; the second row gives the power-
regulation costs per MWh generated. For the case of the first
row, a fully socialized case would translate to all bars for
the 41 wind-power producers being at 0, whereas the last bar
would be at 100%. For the second row, all costs would be
attributed to the demand and reflected by the right-most bar
in the graph.
Results for the integrated mismatch metric with k = 2 are
not shown because they are very similar to the case k = 1.
For this example hour, the contribution for the offshore wind
farms (the first actors on the left side of the histograms) is
significantly higher than for the onshore ones. The last bar
on the right is for the demand; it has the most substantial
contribution to power-regulation needs. Contributions and in-
dividual costs are different, depending on the metrics used.
The largest difference, however, is between the first 3 metrics
(capacity, integrated mismatch, mileage) and the contribution
one. This is because, with the contribution metric, contribution
and costs may be both positive and negative, as certain actors
contribute positively by having power fluctuations that lead to
lower power-regulation needs. Although results for a single
hour look quite extreme, we notice that if calculated over a
month period (Fig 7) the differences in power-regulation costs
9for the various suppliers, as well as demand, are much less.
These are, however, not equivalent to a fully-socialized view of
supporting power-regulation costs (especially on the demand-
side only), as differences in the contribution of the various
actors, and related payments, will remain.
The numerical results in this section confirm the findings
of the previous section: The first three metrics have similar
performances and penalize variability; in contrast, the fourth
metric encourages some forms of variability ( when it has
a positive global effect) and penalizes some others – and is
neutral to the absence of variability.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Acknowledging the fact that increasing penetration for
renewable energy sources, potentially combined with more
proactive demand, will yield increased power fluctuations in
modern power-systems, we have argued that new mechanisms
could be designed for attributing the costs from variability in
power delivery. We have shown that these would distribute
power-regulation related costs in a way that represents contri-
butions to overall costs. This could be an alternative to fully
socializing these costs.
With this proposal, and as electricity markets are inter-
connected, it will be of utmost importance to see how such
mechanisms would work in a multi-area setup. Similarly, as
such a proposal is for a better distribution of costs induced
by fluctuating production and demand, it should be evaluated
whether this would facilitate the deployment of storage and
demand response in support of renewable energy integration.
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Fig. 6. Outcome of the attribution mechanisms for the 1st of March 2014, 1pm to 2pm, based on 15-min resolution.
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Fig. 7. Outcome of the attribution mechanisms for the entire month of March 2014, based on 15-min resolution.
